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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
E. J. HUBER and 
RALPH DUNKLEY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
v. 
VICTOR NEWMAN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 66166 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
Whether or not appellant's petition for a rehearing 
and reversal be granted, appellant petitions the Supreme 
Court for a modification of its opinion and judgment herein 
so as to require and direct the District Court as follows : 
a. That if and when any judgment of that court 
against this appellant shall be entered and become final, 
that the said judgment and any moneys that may come into 
the hands of its clerk or other officer as proceeds thereof 
or security therefor, shall be treated as the assets of a 
defunct or ended partnership, joint venture, or joint busi-
ness enterprise, and be held by the court in the hands of 
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2 
its clerk or receiver until the just debts and liabilities 
thereof shall have been paid. 
b. That said district court be directed to require the 
issuance of citation and notice to creditors of said partner-
ship or joint business enterprise to come in, present and 
prove their claims before the Court within a suitable time 
limit. And that the provisions of Utah Annot. Code, 1943, 
69-1-35 and 69-1-67 and other applicable provisions of said 
title and chapter, and the settled principles of equity prac-
tice and procedure be complied with. 
c. That as to the indebtedness of said. joint enterprise 
to any creditor which may have meantime been paid by 
this appellant, that he be substituted to the rights of such 
creditor with respect to his right to present and prove the 
same before the Court and be paid or credited therewith 
before distribution is made. 
d. That only the balance of such judgment or funds 
after payment of creditors, as aforesaid, may be held for 
distribution among the parties hereto according to the 
terms and provisions of any such final judgment, if and 
when rendered, entered and become final. 
And for grounds of this motion appellant respectfully 
says that the Supreme Court in its opinion and judgment 
herein erred : 
1. In ignoring said Utah code provisions and thereby 
depriving appellant of his property without due process 
of law, contrary to the provisions of Utah Constitution, 
art. 1, section 7; the 14th amendment, section 1, of the 
Constitution of the United States; and the 5th amendment 
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to said United States Constitution. And further depriv-
ing appellant of equal protection of the law contrary to 
Utah Constitution, art. 1, section 2; and United States 
Constitution, 14th amendment, section 1. 
2. In giving effect to a method of distribution of 
asserted partnership assets without first causing payment 
to be made to creditors of the partnership of their just 
claims and demands and citing them to appear and prove 
their claims. 
3. In giving effect by affirmance to a substitute method 
of distribution of partnership assets, by requiring indem-
nity against liability for firm debts in lieu of payment 
thereof before distribution, and then dispensing with such 
indemnity and giving judgment for distribution, in viola-
tion of the provisions of said Title 69, chapter 1, Utah 
Annot. Code of 1943. 
4. In order to give point to these errors appellant 
respectfully refer the Court to the evidences of outstanding 
claims and demands against the asserted partnership of 
Newman-Huber-Dunkley as follows: 
(a) Claim by R. M. Birdzell for $2,632.46 which 
has now been fully paid by appellant, the same being 
just and correct. 
(b) Claim by Harrison & Dorman for $5006.12 
on the first cause of action and $2500 on second 
cause of action, shown by certified copy of the 
complaint and register of actions in case No. 71613 
of the said district court against the parties to 
this action. The action is being defended by appel-
lant but appellees are in default. 
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Reference is made to the referee's report (Rec. 
p. 452) for these items, and to the accompanying 
exhibits filed in this Court herewith under separate 
cover. 
(c) A claim by the United States Government 
for excess profits by virtue of its "renegotiation" 
of contracts embracing the Hospital Job, in the sum 
of $40,000, as evidenced by its written demand for 
payment one-half on March 31, 1944, and balance 
on June 30, 1944, served on the parties to this 
action and filed in the Supreme Court of Utah on 
April 4, 1944. See exhibits filed herewith under 
separate cover. 
{d) Notice of claim by the State of Utah for 
sand and gravel or other materials removed from 
State lands and hauled and delivered in performance 
of contracts involved in this action, in the sum of 
about $2100, and notice of claim or demand therefor 
announced to the district court during the trial 
of this action (Rec. p. 420). 
(e) The possibility of other claims and demands 
that may come to notice hereafter and be enforced 
against Newman, who alone is solvent and finan-
cially responsible, until such possibility is eliminated 
by due notice and citation to creditors to present 
their claims. 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
P. G. ELLIS, 
Attorneys for Appellam. 
STATUTES 
The following sections and parts of Utah Annotated 
Code of 1943, Title 69, Chapter 1, are pertinent: 
69-1-15. The rights and duties of the partners 
in relation to the partnership shall be determined, 
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subject to any agreement between them, by the fol-
lowing rules : 
( 1) Enc:h partner shall be repaid his con tri-
butions, whether by way of capital or advances to 
the partnership, and share equally in the profits and 
surplus remaining after all liabilities including those 
to partners, are satisfied; and must contribute 
tovvard the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, 
sustained by the partnership according to his share 
in the profits. 
(2) The partnership must indemnify every 
partner in respect of payments made and personal 
liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the ordi-
nary and proper conduct of its business, or for the 
preservation of its business or property. 
(3) A partner who in aid of the partnership 
makes any payment or advance beyond the amount 
of capital which he agreed to contribute shall be paid 
interest from the date of the payment or advance. 
* * * * 
69-1-33 (1) The dissolution of a partnership 
does not of itself discharge the existing liability of 
any partner. 
69-1-35(1) When dissolution is caused in any 
way, except in contravention of the partnership 
agreement, each partner, as against his copartners 
and all persons claiming through them in respect 
of their interests in the partnership, unless other-
wise agreed, may have the partnership property 
applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus 
applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the 
respective partners. 
69-1-37. In settling accounts between partners 
after dissolution the following rules shall be ob-
served, subject to any agreement to the contrary: 
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(1) The assets of the partnership are: 
(a) The partnership property. 
(b) The contributions of the partners nec-
essary for the payment of all liabilities speci-
fied in subdivision (2) of this section. 
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank 
in order of payment as follows : 
(a) Those owing to creditors other than 
partners. 
(b) Those owing to partners other than 
for capital and profits. 
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of 
capital. 
(d) Those owing to partners in respect of 
profits. 
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of 
their declaration in subdivision (1) of this section 
to the satisfaction of the liabilities. 
( 4) The partners shall contribute as provided 
by section 69-1-15 (1) the amount necessary to 
satisfy the liabilities; but if any but not all of the 
partners are insolvent, or, not being subject to 
process, refuse to contribute, the other parties shall 
contribute their share of the liabilities, etc. * * * 
( 5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors, 
or any person appointed by the court, shall have 
the right to enforce the contributions specified in 
subdivision ( 4) of this section. 
( 6) Any partner or his legal representative 
shall have the right to enforce the contributions 
specified in subdivision (4) of this section. 
* * * * 
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BRIEF 
In our accompanying brief on petition for rehearing 
we showed that the referee's report in this case is void on 
its face, a dead and lifeless thing. A dead person or thing 
cannot speak or be heard. In order to further show its 
uselessness we shall, in this brief, treat the report as if 
the objections to its invalidity did not exist. The report 
is attached to the bill of exceptions under the rear cloth-
bound cover. 
This is a proceeding to dissolve a partnership as it is 
called in the complaint, wind up its business, take an 
account and distribute the assets. The accounting and dis-
tribution is governed by statute, Utah Code 1943, Title 69, 
Chapter 1, and must conform to its provisions. And this 
is true whether the account is taken by the court itself or 
by its referee. And the very first step is to determine the 
rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partner-
ship, subject to the agreement between them, if any, and 
according to the rules specified in Code section 69-1-15. 
Unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise, each 
partner must, in distribution, be repaid his contributions 
to the capital of the firm, and also his advances or loans 
to it in the course of its business (69-1-15 (1). Wherefore, 
the terms of the agreement, if any, and the amount of the 
contributions and loans or advances by each partner to the 
firm must be found as facts, as a first step in the account-
ing, and stated separately as we next see. F'or these must 
be repaid in their statutory order or turn. After all lia-
bilities of the firm, both to strangers and to partners are 
paid, then the partners share in the profits and surplus 
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remaining, and must contribute toward the losses whether 
of capital or otherwise, in the same proportion as he shares 
in the profits. And so the account taken should exhibit 
the (a) original capital, (b) the profits, and (c) the 
surplus, as well as (d) all liabilities, including those to 
partners; and show (e) the losses, whether "of capital or 
otherwise" (specifying which) sustained by the partner-
ship, toward which each partner must contribute ratably. 
(69-1-15 (1.) 
Not only so, but the account should disclose (a) the 
payments made and (b) liabilities reasonably incurred by 
each partner in the ordinary and proper conduct of the 
business, or for the preservation of its business and prop-
erty; because the partnership must indemnify each partner 
for all such disbursements. (69-1-15 (2.) 
And finally, the account should show any payment or 
advance made by each partner "beyond the amount which 
he agreed to contribute," for the partnership must pay 
interest upon any such excess. (69-1-15 (3.) 
Section 69-1-35 gives to each partner the right to in-
sist upon having the partnership assets applied to dis-
charge first its liabilities (whether to strangers or part-
ners), and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount 
due to each partner. The amount due to each being figured 
by the above rules. 
The account taken by the referee is lacking in segrega-
tion and separate statement of almost every one of the above 
essentials, viz. : terms of agreement, agreed contributions 
of each partner to capital, amount of each partner's loans 
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or advancements in excess of contributions to capital, lia-
bilities of the firm (a) to strangers and (b) to partners; 
the profits and surplus, and losses (a) of capital (b) or 
otherwise, stated separately. Also, (a) payments made and 
(b) liabilities incurred by each partner for the common 
benefit for which he must be indemnified; and payments 
by each partner in excess of his agreed contribution to 
capital, on which he must receive interest. 
How can a partner demand and insist upon the statu-
tory distribution unless the account taken discloses these 
various essential items and order of payments? 
Section 69-1-37 provides that in settling accounts be-
tween partners after dissolution the following rules shall 
be observed unless there is some agreement to the con-
trary, viz. : 
(1) The assets consist of (a) the partnership property 
and (b) the contributions of the partners to pay liabilities 
as follows: 
(2) The liabilities shall rank in order of payment as 
follows : (a) to creditors other than partners; (b) to part-
ners other than for capital and profits; (c) to partners 
in respect of capital, and (d) to partners in respect of 
profits. 
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order specified 
in subdivision ( 1) of this section in satisfaction of lia-
bilities. 
( 4) The partners shall contribute as provided by sec-
tion 69-1-15 ( 1) the amount necessary to satisfy liabilities. 
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( 5) An assignee for creditors, or any person appointed 
by the court has the right to enforce the contributions 
specified in subdivision ( 4) hereof. 
(6) Any partner shall have the right to enforce con-
tributions specified in subdivision ( 4) hereof. 
The referee's account does not state separately (a) the 
partnership property and (b) the contributions required 
of each partner in order to satisfy the liabilities specified 
in subdivision (2) as above. That is to say, the referee 
made no finding of fact, to wit: no adjudication of the 
facts which by statute must constitute the basis for distri-
bution of the assets to creditors and partners in the statu-
tory order of priority or preference. 
An official act required by statute which does not con-
form to the statute is ineffectual and void, and a failure to 
object thereto does not validate it, being void upon its face 
(see pages zy .. JJ of our brief on rehearing filed here-
with). For that matter, the report was not evidence but 
adjudication, if effectual at all, and if void on its face re-
quires no objection at any set time or place. Also, there-
port was produced by plaintiffs' counsel and filed (Rec. 
p. 316) in the midst of a trial undertaken for other and 
unknown purposes, without pleadings or issues, and with-
out opportunity for inspection and preparation of w~itten 
objections and exceptions, which the law envisages. If the 
referee had filed his report in court which appointed him 
to act, at the time it was completed on May 28, 1943, as 
was his duty, ·the situation would have been different. 
Instead he gave it to the plaintiffs' attorney who suppressed 
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it until he was ready to file it in the midst of a trial on 
unknown issues. 
Certainly one of the most indispensible requirements 
of the governing statute is a clear statement of the debts 
and liabilities of the defunct partnership (a) to strangers 
and (b) to partners, itemized as per statute, supra, as a 
guide to the order of payment and distribution of the 
assets. The referee's report did not attempt to comply 
with this primary requirement of the statute. And yet 
the power and authority conferred upon him by law and 
the order of reference was that he might conduct a trial, 
hear evidence and make findings of fact and conclusions 
of law upon which the court could enter a judgment for 
payment to creditors and distribution of the balance to 
the partners in conformity to the statute. Nor did the 
district court's own findings of fact supply the omissions 
in the report in this respect. 
Page 5 of the referee's report shows that his attention 
was attracted to the subject of creditors, and he mentions 
one claim by R. M. Birdzell for $2632.45, and another by 
Harrison & Dorman for $7579.64 (Rec. p. 452), but he 
does not adjudicate them, or say he has investigated and 
allowed them, and find that they should be paid. He passes 
them up to the district court and says that if the court 
finds them 0. K. they should be paid by contributions of 
the partners, one-third each. The district court did not 
accept the suggestion that it inquire as to creditors with 
preferential rights but gave judgment against defendant 
partner for distribution of the assets without payment 
of debts. Appellant has paid the Birdzell claim and is de-
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fending the Harrison-Dorman claim in court. (See exhibits 
filed herewith.) 
But the two claims mentioned were not, and are not, 
all the claims and liabilities outstanding against the assets 
of the partnership. A demand has been made by the 
United States War Department upon each and all the 
parties to this action, as partners, for the payment of 
$40,000, whereof one-half is payable March 31st, the other 
half on June 30th, 1944, for excess profits charged and 
paid during the year 1942 on sundry jobs of which the 
Hospital Job in this case was one. And in the process of 
collection the government has laid its hand upon the net 
earnings of the Hospital Job, and forbidden its distribu-
tion to the partners or others in this case. That is done 
pursuant to a statute of the United States passed in aid 
of the defense effort, and to conserve the government 
financing of war defense contracts. See notice and demand 
served on counsel for all parties in this case by the United 
States and filed in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court on April 4th, 1944. And see bound exhibits filed 
herewith under separate cover. And see section 403 of the 
Sixth Supplemental National Defense Act, 1942, as amended. 
That is certainly a liability of the partnership arising from 
public law and the very incidents of the contract for the 
Hospital Job under which the earnings involved herein 
accrued. And if the assets are insufficient the partners 
are liable for contribution to meet it. Hence it appears 
that there can be no net earnings available for distribution 
until the claims of creditors are adjudicated and paid. 
Yet the district court has entered up a judgment against 
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appellant for $19,451.03 by way of attempted distribution 
of assets without regard to liabilities. The district court's 
attention was called to this hazard and liability of the 
Hospital Job contract to be renegotiated and profits elim-
inated (Rec. p. 420). And the court even undertook to 
require security against renegotiation as well as payment of 
debts in the sum of some $10,000 by requiring a $7000 
bond to indemnify against several times that amount of 
liabilities. And the indemnifying bond was never given. 
But judgment went for $19,451.03 just the same. 
Nor was the foregoing all the liabilities. Appellant's 
counsel gave notice, and announced in open court, at the 
moment when the discussion about the indemnifying bond 
was going on, that he had just received notice that the 
State of Utah claimed a large sum against this partnership 
for excavation of gravel or other materials from a pit 
on State lands. (Rec. p. 420.) But neither court nor 
counsel paid any attention. They went right along dis-
cussing the giving of a $7000 bond (never in fact given) 
·as if the matter of debts and liabilities several times that 
amount was of no significance. 
The only way in which the district court could be sure 
in this matter would be for it to cause a notice to creditors 
of the concern to come in and present and prove their 
claims within a reasonable time limit, or be barred, accord-
ing to settled equity practice in the administration of 
estates for the benefit of creditors and partners or stock-
holders. We called attention to this statutory and equity 
procedure at pages 87-88 of our opening brief on this 
appeal. For further data on this point see infra page 21. 
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NET EARNINGS 
Going now to another indispensible feature of an 
accounting in order to make the statutory distribution of 
assets, we go to the opposite side of the ledger and inquire 
how much were the net earnings. The referee attempted 
to answer this question in Exhibit A to his report (Rec. 
p. 455) where a tabulation is made of receipts and dis-
bursements. Thus: 
Gross earnings, itemized, . . . . . . . . . $61,138.48 
Expenses, 
Disbursements itemized 
Accounts payable, " 
Railroad Job, " 
Total, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47,667.60 
Net earnings, ........... $13,470.78 
By reference to the tabulations in Exhibits B and C 
to the report (Rec. p. 456-457) it appears that, due to 
debits and credits in the account of each partner with the 
firm, this $13,470.78 is nearly all in the hands of partner 
Newman-that is, $13,386·.37 of it. And the balance of 
$84.41 must have been in the hands of one or both the other 
partners Huber andjor Dunkley. Thus: 
Total net earnings, ............. . 
Newman's account, ............. . 
$13,470.78 
13,386.37 
Elsewhere, ..................... $ 84.41 
The result is that partner Newman appears to owe 
his firm of Newman-Huber-Dunkiley practically all its 
present capita.l assets. And the firm (if it had paid its 
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debts) owed Newman back his one-third of the capital 
belonging to him on distribution, that is, one-third of 
$13,470.78, which is $4,490.26. Deduct this $4,490.26 from 
the net capital funds in his hands which is $13,386.37, and 
Newman would really be accountable for only the balance 
of $8,896.11 to Huber and Newman for their two-thirds 
share of the net earnings. Assuming that the debts were 
all paid $8,896.11 is the most that partner Newman is 
liable for to his partners, according to the referee's report. 
Notwithstanding which, a judgment was entered for the full 
$13,386.37 (of which he himself was part owner) in favor 
of the other two partners, coupled with another illegal 
item of $6,064.66 (of which we speak presently), and 
thereby brought the total judgment to $19,451.03. 
But the debts of the firm have not been paid in full,. 
and both the court and the referee knew it. At least they 
knew there were potential claims of creditors that ought 
to be adjudicated. And the court, conscious of its duty 
in the premises, at first proposed to hold back from judg-
ment and distribution enough of the $13,386.37 in New--
man's hands to meet and pay the Birdzell and Harrison-
norman claims (Rec. p. 367-371 and post p. 22). But 
the court was prevailed upon by plaintiffs' counsel to side-
step this duty and give judgment for distribution without 
regard to creditors. The court at first ordered an in--
demnifying bond of $7000.00 to secure creditors, an insuffi-
cient amount; then relented and gave judgment in full 
without security. (Rec. p. 88-92.) The court was with-
out discretion or authority to disregard the governing stat--
ute and adopt a substitute, or no substitute, in dealing with 
the claims of creditors, and the rights of defendant partner~ 
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The district court adopted by copying the tabulations 
in Exhibits A, B and C of the referee's report, self-con-
demnatory as they are, into its own finding; paragraph 5 
(Rec. p. 85-87). And then it proceeded in its next para-
graph 6 to add $6,064.66 to the $13,386.37 erroneously 
charged by paragraph 5, to give judgment for the total 
$19,451.03. This was done, not on the basis of anything_ 
contained or stated in the referee's report nor upon any 
evidence before the referee coming into court with the 
report, but upon evidence de novo taken by the district 
court at its adjourned June, 1943, session of trial of this 
case. To properly understand this new evidence, and its 
scope, we must go back and understand the scope of the 
firm's business comprised in the referee's report of busi-
ness closing on September 3rd, 1942. 
At the first two days' trial in April, 1942, the plain .. 
tiffs proved as part of their case that the firm's business 
closed with completion of the Hospital Job on September 
3rd, 1942 (Dunkley, Rec. p. 191; Earl Bishop, Rec. p. 356-7). 
And the trial court on April 6th, 1943, ruled from the 
bench that on September 3rd, 1942 "the joint venture on 
all these operations ceased at that time." (Rec. p. 303, 305.) 
Accordingly the court in the order of reference directed the 
referee to take the accounting down to September 3rd, 
1942 (Rec. p. 78-79). And the referee's report was that 
he had investigated within that limitation, in producing 
the balance of $13,386.37 against Newman of firm assets 
in his hands. See also Schedule "7" of his report CRee. p. 
463) whereon this item appears, viz.: 
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HOSPITAL JOB, 
Yardage hauled from Aug. 11, 1942 
to Sept. 3rd, 1942, per letter &c, 
59492 cu. yds at 59 cents,. . $41,049.48 
And this item was figured into the general summary of 
Exhibits A and B of the report. Nothing after September 
3rd was figured in the tabulations of the report. 
But the referee on page 4 of his report (Rec. p. 451) 
made mention of information he had received in a letter 
from some one that Newman had hauled some additional 
yardage on the Hospital Job after September 3rd, 1942, 
in an amount bringing up the total hauled from 49·,492 
cubic yards shown in the report, to 72,676.05 cubic yards; 
that is, an increase of 13,184.05 yards. But the referee 
says in his report that he had been unable by his unofficial 
and nonjudicial inquiries to ascertain the facts as to the 
placement of this additional yardage-whether on the Hos-
pital Job itself (before reported complete and finished 
on September 3, 1942), or whether it was hauled to other 
locations as required by the Army Engineers. Hence the 
referee did not adjudicate or find the facts in this regard, 
and there was no basis in the report or evidence behind it 
for the district court to do so. 
But the report at bottom of Rec. p. 451 to 452 does 
recite that the original Hospital Job contract called for 
a total of 100,000 cubic yards of fill to be hauled at 59 
cents a cubic yard. In view of the report and record show-
ing, supra, that the Hospital Job was completed on Septem-
ber 3, 1942, with the delivery of only 59,492 cubic yards 
at the hospital site, this leaves open the inquiry as to what 
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-if anything became of the balance of 40,508 cubic yards that 
the Army Engineers could have required under the con-
tract. 
The answer to this question is partly revealed in evi-
dence taken before the district court at its first session 
beld on April 5th-6th, 1942, before the referee was ap-
pointed, but which was not carried into the referee's 
investigations or report. From that evidence it appears 
that the Army Engineers maneuvered to compel Newman 
to complete the 100,000 cubic yards called for in his con-
tract for the Hospital Job by deliveries of material required 
by the Army at other locations near Wend over, without 
having to let a new contract therefor. On this point New-
man testified before the court in April, 1942, that: 
"The contract was written for 100,000 yards 
of fill for a total price of $59,000. I had a lot of 
trouble trying to get an estimate. I needed the 
money and I couldn't get an estimate through for 
the money that was coming. So the Army Engineers 
told me, "Why don't you finish your haul?" So, I 
says, "All right, I will finish the haul for thirty-
one thousand, approximately, that was still owing on 
the hospital job, and I hauled that 31,000 yards to 
various locations as the Army Engineers directed. 
So that the Hospital Job, the original contract, was 
not finished until January 21, 1943. The dirt that 
was hauled since Sept. 16th, 1943 went to various 
locations as the Army Engineers directed, but I had 
to do that in order to get my money from the Army 
Engineers. (Rec. p. 239-240.) 
This testimony was not repeated before the referee 
for the simple reason that the referee did not conduct a 
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trial, call for witnesses or give counsel an opportunity to 
produce them and try the case in observance of due process 
of law. If he had done this he would have had the fore-
going evidence before him and would have known that he 
need not trouble himself therewith under the terms of the 
order of reference limiting him to September 3rd, 1942. 
He had nothing to do with the "placement" of material 
delivered thereafter to other locations. Appellees had term-
inated their connection with Newman on September 3rd, 
1942; Huber had gone elsewhere, and Dunkley was work-
ing for Newman at $100 a week wages. 
But the bare mention of this additional haulage after 
September 3rd, 1942, by Newman excited the cupidity of 
appellees and their trial attorney, and they set out to try 
and "get in on it" by additional trial proceedings when the 
district court met again in adjourned session on June 3rd-
4th, 1942. There was and is no authority of law for this 
attempt to open up the referee's trial (if it may be so 
termed) and get in behind the referee's findings of fact 
in his report, by means of evidence de novo that was not 
heard or considered by the referee, nor authorized in the 
order of reference. Not any more than there would be to 
take evidence de novo to enlarge the amount of a jury 
verdict or to enlarge the recovery in the court's findings 
of fact in a trial without a jury. The only recourse was 
either to obtain a new trial or to appeal, if dissatisfied 
with the amount recovered. 
Even if this unusual and illegal procedure could be 
tolerated under existing law, yet there was no evidence 
-offered de novo before the court to match and reproduce 
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the information before the referee upon which he attempted 
to adjudicate the various items of debits, credits and bal-
ances on account of transactions closing September 3rd, 
1942. So that the basis for district court findings con-
sisted of a sort of patchwork-report and adjudication 
without a trial or evidence before the referee, relating to 
transactions prior to September 3rd, 1942, spliced with 
evidence de novo taken before the district court as to 
transactions after September 3rd, 1942, without proofs of 
operating costs and expenses whereby to strike a balance 
and show net earnings. 
Assuming that this procedure were legally or theoreti--
cally possible, the testimony submitted was utterly and 
absurdly inadequate to prove the proposition that plaintiffs 
were entitled to credit for the additional haulage by New--
man to various locations after September 3rd, 1942, under 
orders of the Army Engineers, even though allocated to the-
Hospital Job total haulage authorized of 100,000 cubic 
yards. If any one wishes to go through the record of plain-
tiffs' attempt to do this, the record is there for his informa-
tion, pages 309-422. 
To sum up, however, the district court did entertain 
this attempt to do the impossible, and considered the frag-
mentary data offered, during which plaintiffs' counsel re-
peatedly confessed himself helpless and bankrupt of the 
desired proofs. For our treatment of this subject see our· 
opening brief on this appeal at pages 91-97. 
In the district court's findings of fact at the end of this 
abortive attempt to open and enlarge the recovery in the 
referee's report, the court recorded a finding of fact that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
72,676.05 cubic yards were hauled and delivered on the 
Hospital Job (an enlargement of 13,184.05 over the 59,492 
cubic yards found in the referee's report) priced at 69 cents 
a cubic yard (in lieu of 59 cents in the contract), amount-
ing to $6,064.66, and added that amount to the $13,386.37 
reported by the referee, as net earnings, without even 
inquiring as to the cost and expenses incurred by Newman 
in making the additional haulage and deliveries after Sep-
tember 3rd, 1942. 
There is evidence in the record that the occasion for 
the change order and increased price was that better and 
more desirable material was available at another place re-
quiring a longer haul and greater cost to the contractor. 
This change order was initiated on September 6th, 1942 
(after appellees no longer were connected with the job and 
while Dunkley was working for wages for Newman at 
$100 a week, which is not disputed on either side), and 
was finally approved by the War Department in December, 
1942, after nearly all the additional haulage had been done 
by Newman. In consideration of the longer haul and extra 
cost the government allowed ten cents a cubic yard to 
Newman for the entire job. But the whole and entire 
consideration for this change order was performed by 
Newman alone, and not by Huber or Dunkley. See record 
pages 397 to 403. 
Debts and Liabilities. (See ante pages 10-13.) Before 
closing, we recur to this feature of the accounting. At the 
adjourned session of court in June, 1943, the court and 
counsel were discussing the claims of creditors and the 
possibility of renegotiation of the Hospital Job contract 
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eliminating part of the net profits, if any. The Birdzeli 
and Harrison-Dorman claims being particularly mentioned. 
We quote certain remarks of the court only, so as to show 
that it had in mind the rights of creditors, and the right 
of a partner to have debts paid before distribution. Thus; 
THE COURT: 
"In order to find the amount due I have to 
determine what the net profit is, and I can't do that 
until I determine what the obligations are." (Rec. p. 
367-8.) 
"Of course, there is this partnership proposi-
tion; these alleged creditors could probably sue one 
or all of them." (Rec. p. 368.) 
"Why not put enough of this money to cover 
these claims some place and let them bring an action 
against one or all?" (Rec. p. 368.) 
"Or, the suggestion of the plaintiffs in this 
case that they indemnify." (Rec. p. 369.) 
"Maybe what I should do is to hold this up and 
let them sue." (Rec. p. 371.) 
"I wouldnt want to distribute this amount here. 
I wouldnt want to say now that they dont owe these 
people that money and therefore distribute it. - (Rec. 
p. 371.) 
Notwithstanding which the court in its finding of fact, 
paragraph 7, R.ec. p. 88, incorporated a provision requir-
ing that plaintiffs Huber and Dunkley give an indemnify-
ing bond for $7000.00 to protect Newman against having 
to pay the claims of Birdzell and Harrison-Dorman, which 
totalled $10,212.09, or rather against two-thirds thereof 
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which Huber and Dunkley would be liable for, in the sum 
of $6,808.66, togther with costs, expenses and damages 
and also covering "any renegotiatiow" by the War Depart-
ment in respect of excess profits. The $7000 bond would 
barely cover the two-thirds of the Birdzell and Harrison-
Dorman cairns alone, not to speak of the hazard of re-
negotiation proceedings involving a much larger contingent 
liability, which has now eventuated in a demand for repay-
ment of $40,000.00 in short order. We do not know how 
much of this $40,000 is allocable to the Hospital Job or 
other job involved in this action; nor whether the Govern-
ment will insist on holding all the earnings until a settle-
ment is made. In any event we are advised that the excess 
profits on the Hospital Job alone are equal to or in excess 
of the entire net earnings on all the jobs reported by the 
referee, which was $13,470.78. This is due to the fact that 
while the total earnings on the Hospital Job alone is re-
ported by the referee as $41,049.48, there were losses on the 
other jobs embraced in the report, which reduced the net 
earnings on all the jobs together down to $13,470.78, as 
shown in Exhibit A (Rec. p. 455). 
As it turned out, no indemnifying bond was ever given, 
and yet the court gave judgment for distribution to part-
ners Huber and Dunkleye for $19,451.03, contrary to the 
express provisions of our statutes quoted on the opening 
pages of this brief, which require payment to creditors in 
cash, before any distribution to partners. 
We think the clear result is that the judgment appealed 
from should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
But that in any event this court's opinion and judgment 
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should be modified so as to require the district court, in 
the event it shall finally find against this appellant, to 
proceed in conformity to Title 6H, Chapter 1, by citing credi-
tors in to present and prove their claims, and thereafter by 
proceeding under said chapter and title in determining the 
distributive share of each partner before ordering distri-
bution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
P. G. ELLIS, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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